Accessibiliser les pratiques de recherche sur le handicap : une approche par les droits humains.

INTRODUCTION: In this article, we offer an overview of the Capdroits participatory research approach, initially focusing on the controversy surrounding Article 12 of the International Convention of Persons with Disabilities, “Recognition of legal personality under conditions of equality.” Its objective is to encourage the participation of the people concerned by Article 12. It brings together academic researchers, experts in support relationships, and people directly concerned by impediment situations. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY: In this contribution, we present our participatory research approach, the methodology of “public problem-solving” and the ways in which it was deployed. We will show how productions and evaluations have been made accessible, while identifying the tensions at work. RESULTS: Two phases of research have been developed and deployed since 2015, based on an experimental “public problem-solving” methodology. Several collaborative productions have been developed, intended for various types of reception and made possible thanks to accessibility practices. They nevertheless highlight the tensions produced in the participatory processes. CONCLUSIONS: The epistemology that we have been collectively developing since 2015 radically aims to reduce social and cognitive inequalities by promoting experiential knowledge while perpetuating inequalities. Our ability to dialogue [14] is the basis for co-constructing a radical epistemology, which, while imperfect, is profoundly purposeful.

Capacity Trajectory in the Context of Dementia: A Case of Exercising Rights in Troubled Civil Life.

For years, Common law and Civil Code have determined the legal age as majority which defines adulthood, giving a presumption of legal capacity to adults. At this age, all adults are presumed to be capable of making their own decisions, protecting their interests and exercising the rights they enjoy in the acts of their civil life. This legal presumption of capacity structures the life-course of adults and allows them to act and make decisions either in daily life or for exceptional civil acts, for instance, marriage. Domestic laws, including French laws, do provide for certain exceptions, especially for persons suffering from disease or disabilities. The use of substitutive decision-making, or "coercive legal" measures, is increasing. At the same time, these legal substitutive decision-making measures have encountered challenges. The cornerstone Article of International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) reaffirms the exigence of equal recognition of all persons before the law with equal capacity. The interpretation of this article 12 is subject to considerable controversy. The controversy around CRPD and the paradox between the normative evolution of fundamental rights and the increasing uses of legal substitutive decision-making measures in social practices raise questions about the place of this legal presumption of capacity. In this article, we wish to tackle this controversy by starting with situations where the daily capacity to exercise one's rights becomes an issue for the professional or family circle. What happens when persons seem unable to understand the consequences of their actions or when they behave incomprehensibly according to their close ones? When should others around the person worry about the person's ability to take care of oneself? What happens when a person's ways of functioning change? Is it an indication that his or her state of health is experiencing changes? That the person's needs have evolved? What does this imply for family and friends, especially in terms of actions or substitute decisions? Using the core notion of "capacity trajectory," this article intends to empirically shed light on how rights and legal capacity are exercised in situations of vulnerability. We wish to demonstrate that the presumption of capacity requires certain "conditions of capacity" in practice.

Challenges of regulatory rights of half-capacitated persons: A sociological perspective on the French Civil Code reform.

Democratic societies are based on the principle of equal legal capacity of all citizens to decide and act for themselves in all areas of social life. This "socio-civil capacity", which may involve both material property of an individual, as well as private life in matters ranging from health to personal relationships, is recognized by the law (both codified law and common law). These rights guarantee the autonomy and freedom of individuals in the name of respect for human dignity. Civil capacity of a person is legally diminished because his or her "natural" abilities, capacity, or competence are reduced. Recent social changes have lead to increased uses of legal measures of protection. The reasons for these changes are complex and they are accompanied by legislative reforms that modify the rights of half-capacitated persons. In this article, we examine certain issues of civil capacity rights based on the French example. We start present a perspective of the historical definition and practice of these rights as well as their democratization.

Confinement and psychiatric care: a comparison between high-security units for prisoners and for difficult patients in France.

This paper examines the uncertain meaning of confinement in psychiatric care practices. Investigating the recent expansion of high-security units in French public psychiatry, for patients with dangerous behavior (units for difficult patients) and for suffering prisoners (specially equipped hospital units), we aim to understand psychiatry's use of confinement as part of its evolving mandate over suffering individuals with violent behavior. Although historically the epicenter of secure psychiatric care for dangerous individuals shifted from the asylum to the prison, a review of public reports and psychiatric literature demonstrates that psychiatrists' attempt to reclaim confinement as part of therapeutic practice underpinned the recent development of new units. Institutional-level analysis emphasizes psychiatry's enduring concern to subordinate social defense motives to a therapeutic rationale. Analyzing local professionals' justifications for these units in two emblematic hospitals, the paradoxical effects of a security-driven policy arise: they allowed the units' existence, yet prevented psychiatrists from defending a genuine therapeutic justification for confinement. Instead, professionals differentiate each unit's respective mission, underlining the concern for access to care and human dignity or defending the need for protection and safety from potentially dangerous patients. This process reveals the difficulty of defining confinement practices as care when autonomy is a core social value.